NOTES
TINKER REVISITED: FRASER V. BETHEL
SCHOOL DISTRICT AND REGULATION OF
SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District1
the Supreme Court held that the first amendment protects a public
school student's speech so long as the speech does not "materially and
substantially" disrupt the school's operation and discipline, and does not
collide with the rights of other students. Numerous students have relied
on Tinker to challenge school regulations and policies. 2 Fraserv. Bethel
School District3 is a recent case in which a high school student relied on
Tinker to challenge his suspension from high school. In Fraser,a seventeen-year-old student was suspended for delivering a crude and sexually
suggestive speech 4 at a high school assembly. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit mechanically applied Tinker and held that
the student's first amendment rights were abridged because the school
failed to show that the speech "materially and substantially" disrupted
the school's operation.5 The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[a]s long as
the speech was neither obscene nor disruptive, the First Amendment pro'6
tects [the student] from punishment by school officials."
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Fraser7 and appears
ready to revisit "the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.",, Many
lower federal courts 9 have assumed that Tinker's material and substantial disruption standard is dispositive in all elementary and secondary
school speech cases. Yet there are three current methods of analyzing
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
See infra note 48 for the entire text of Fraser's speech.
Fraser,755 F.2d at 1364-65.
Id. at 1365.
Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.

9. See infra note 32-50 and accompanying text.
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government restrictions on speech: categorical proscription analysis,10
the public forum doctrine,11 and time, place, and manner analysis.' 2
This note will demonstrate that Tinker is actually a public forum doctrine case, 13 with the material and substantial disruption standard representing the compelling state interest that the doctrine generally requires
to justify state restriction of speech.' 4 By limiting analysis of school free
speech cases to the Tinker standard, lower federal courts have, in essence, assumed that all such cases involve the public forum doctrine. In
fact, school regulations like those in Fraserare correctly categorized as
5
legitimate time, place, and manner restrictions.'
This note first reviews Tinker and the Ninth Circuit's application of
that case in Fraser.16 After a discussion of the three forms of analysis the
Court employs in free speech cases, 17 the note demonstrates that Tinker
is actually a public forum doctrine case.' 8 The note concludes that the
school regulation in Fraser was a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction that justified disciplining the student for delivering a crude
and sexually suggestive speech at the assembly. 19

I. TINKER AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
In Tinker, the Supreme Court recognized that neither student nor
teacher "shed their constitutional right to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'20 The dispute in Tinker arose when two
high school students and one junior high school student decided to publicize their opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to
school. The principals of the schools became aware of the plan and
adopted a policy that students wearing armbands to school would be
asked to remove them; students refusing would be suspended until they
returned to school without the armbands. The students were aware of
the regulation, but they ignored it and were suspended.2 ' The Supreme
10. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.

11. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.

13. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 20-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-97 and accompanying text.

20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
21. Id. at 504. The students sought an injunction restraining the school district from disciplining them. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa
1966). The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the school principals' actions
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Court held that the students' suspensions violated the first amendment
because the school administrators failed to show that the students' "silent, passive" 2 2 expression of opinion materially and substantially inter-

fered with school discipline and operation or collided with the rights of
23

the other students.
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court balanced the schools'
concern with discipline against the students' right to freedom of expression.24 The Court rejected the district court's conclusion that school administrators acted reasonably in suspending the students because of the
fear that the students wearing the armbands might cause a disturbance.
The Court stated that "undifferentiated fear . . . of disturbance is not
'25
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.
The Court offered a pedagogical rationale for prohibiting Tinkertype restrictions in the public schools. 26 It examined the constitutional
nature of schools, education, and students and concluded that schools
are not to be "enclaves of totalitarianism"; 27 the states should not operate
their schools to foster homogeneous outlooks, because the classroom is
the "marketplace of ideas" where students learn through exposure to a
28
multitude of views.
Justices Black and Harlan dissented. Justice Black expressed the
view that "[tihe Court's holding in this case ushers in . . .an entirely
new era in which the power to control [public high school] pupils. . . is
. . .transferred to the Supreme Court. ' 29 Justice Black was concerned
that the majority opinion would enable students and teachers to use the
were constitutionally permissible because they prevented the students from disturbing school discipline. Id. The Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc and, by an equally divided court, affirmed
the district court's decision without opinion. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en bane).
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
23. See id. at 513.
24. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-08; see also infra note 92 and accompanying text.
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. The school administrators attempted to justify the regulation on
the ground that some friends of a former classmate who was killed in Vietnam might confront the
students and cause a disturbance. Id. at 509 n.3.
26. See Diamond, The FirstAmendment and PublicSchools: The Case Against JudicialInter.
vention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477, 480 (1981).
27. The Court stated:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School authorities do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations
to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
28. Id. at 512.
29. Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
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school as a platform to air their beliefs at the expense of other students'
education. 30 Justice Harlan agreed that the first and fourteenth amendments governed the conduct of the school administrators; however, he
proposed that students should have the burden of showing that a particu31
lar school rule was not motivated by legitimate school concerns.
B.

Tinker's Progeny: Fraser v. Bethel School District.
Justice Black's fear that Tinker ushered in a "new era" in which

courts would play a significant role in school discipline was well
founded.3 2 Since Tinker, hundreds of cases have been brought by stu-

dents alleging violations of their constitutional rights.3 3 Students have
used Tinker and the Constitution to challenge the actions of public
3 5 discipline, 3 6
34
school authorities concerning dances, demonstrations,
student body elections, 3 7 school searches, 38 hair length,39 library books, 4°
30. See id. at 517, 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 600 n.22 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Justice Black's prophecy in Tinker was being fulfilled).
33. Id.; see also infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
34. See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 387 (D.R.I. 1980) (school officials denied first
amendment rights of homosexual student when they refused to allow him to bring male escort to

prom).
35. See Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Separate School Dist., 594 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1979)
(sustaining injunction against desegregation demonstrations conducted by students and parents on
property adjacent to high school on ground that protests interfered with school's operations); Karp
v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1973) (high school student could not be suspended for carrying sign to protest firing of teacher); Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 1972) (reversing
dismissal of complaint brought by high school student against principal who refused to allow students to protest Vietnam War during school); Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 452
F.2d 673, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing dismissal of high school student's complaint that suspension for passing out leaflets violated first amendment).
36. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (cruel and unusual punishment clause of
eighth amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in public secondary schools); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (procedural due process requires that public secondary school students have some type of hearing prior to suspension or expulsion); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607,
611 (4th Cir. 1980) (substantive due process rights might be implicated in school disciplinary punishment); Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1974) (due process does not
preclude principal from basing expulsions on hearsay), cert denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). See generally Rossow, Administrative Discretionand Student Suspension: A Lion in Waiting, 13 J.L. & EDUC.
417 (1984); Teitelbaum, School DisciplineProcedures: Some EmpiricalFindingsand Some Theoretical Questions, 58 IND. L.J. 547 (1983).
37. See Palacios v. Foltz, 441 F.2d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 1971) (student does not have constitutional right to run for co-president of student council).
38. Cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 739 (1985) (fourth amendment applies to unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by public school officials).
39. The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have stated that federal courts
should provide a judicial forum in school hair-length cases. See Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49,
51-52 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783
(4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424
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movies, 4 1 school plays, 42 prayer meetings, 43 textbook selection," and

school newspapers. 45
Fraserv. Bethel School District46 is a recent case in which a student
F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 850 (1970). The Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have stated that federal courts should
not provide a judicial forum in school hair-length cases. See Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1975); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir. 1974);
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Freeman
v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261-62 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1971) (two cases consolidated at court of
appeals level), cert denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971) and cert. denied sub nom. Olff v. East Side Union
High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972).
40. See, eg., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (plurality opinion) (whether
school board's removal of books from public school library comports with first amendment depends
on the school board's motive for removing books).
41. See Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 776-79 (8th Cir. 1982) (school
board's removal of film to suppress ideological or religious viewpoint with which school board disagreed violated students' first amendment rights).
42. See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1981) (school superintendent's decision
to cancel high school production of play because of its sexual theme did not violate students' first
amendment right of expression).
43. See, eg., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 561 (3d Cir. 1984) (student-organized religious group could not meet during a student activity hour), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 1167 (1985); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1048
(5th Cir. 1982) (school district policy permitting voluntary prayer groups violates establishment
clause), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979-80 (2d Cir.
1980) (school board's refusal to allow prayer sessions before classes did not violate students' right to
free speech), cert. denied, 454 US. 1123 (1981). See generally Strossen, A Frameworkfor Evaluating
Equal Access Claims by Student Religious Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall
Separating Church and State?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 143 (1985); Note, Religious Expression in the
Public School Forum: The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEo. L.J. 135 (1983);
Note, The ConstitutionalDimensions of Student-InitiatedReligious Activity in Public High Schools,
92 YALE L.J. 499 (1983).
44. See Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1983) (high school students have
standing to challenge Oregon textbook selection statute that allegedly restricts first amendment
rights); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1153-54 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (students' and school
administrators' successful challenge of Mississippi's textbook "rating committee" decision not to
purchase book).
45. See, eg., Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (high school newspaper protected by first amendment); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512,
519-20 (2d Cir. 1977) (students' first amendment rights to publish sex questionnaire subordinate to
school administrator's power), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School
Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1972) (school rule requiring prior submission and approval of
newspaper declared facially unconstitutional as overbroad because it allowed administrators to impose prior restraints for any reason); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13-15 (7th Cir. 1970)
(en bane) (expulsion of student newspaper writers for criticizing school policies and authorities violates students' first amendment rights), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). See generally Huffman &
Trauth, High School Students' PublicationRights and PriorRestraint, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 485 (1981);
Nichols, Vulgarity and Obscenity in the Student Press, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 207 (1981); Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REv. 625 (1985).
46. 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
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relied on Tinker to challenge a school regulation. 47 At a school assembly, Matthew Fraser, a seventeen-year-old high school student, nominated a friend and classmate for school office by delivering a crude and
48
sexually suggestive speech.
The day after the speech, the assistant principal charged Fraser with
violating the school's disruptive conduct rule.49 He was suspended for
three days, and his name was removed from the list of eligible graduation
speakers. When the superintendent of the school district denied Fraser's
appeal, Fraser filed a lawsuit alleging that the school had violated his first
amendment rights. The district court relied on Tinker's material and

substantial disruption standard and held for Fraser, declaring his punishment null and void, and awarding him damages, costs, and attorney's
50
fees.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the school district presented three
arguments to support its claim that the disciplinary action did not
abridge Fraser's constitutional rights: (1) Fraser's speech materially and
substantially disrupted the school's educational process; (2) Fraser's indecent language justified the disciplinary actions; and (3) the school district could discipline Fraser for the objectionable language because
Fraser made the speech at a school-sponsored function. 5' The court of
appeals considered and rejected each argument.
The court found that the school district's evidence failed to establish
that Fraser's speech materially and substantially interfered with the educational process. That evidence consisted of the testimony of school
counselors and teachers that one student in the bleachers simulated masturbation, two others simulated sexual intercourse, some students hooted
47. The rule, which was published in the school's student handbook, stated:
In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation in certain noncriminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are acts
which disrupt and interfere with the educational process.
Disruptive Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.
Fraser,755 F.2d at 1357 n.l.
48. The following is the entire text of Fraser's nominating speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most of all his belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm. Jeff Kuhiman is a
man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the
wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing and pushing
until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--even the climax, for
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president-he'll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.
Fraser,755 F.2d at 1357.
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., No. C83-306T (W.D. Wash. June 8, 1983), afid, 755 F.2d
1356 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
51. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1358-59.
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and hollered, and other students acted shocked and embarrassed.5 2 It
included complaints by several teachers that student discussion of Fraser's speech had disrupted their classes the next day and written statements submitted by other teachers complaining that Fraser's speech was
inappropriate for a school assembly.5 3 The court of appeals, however,
held that the school district had failed to distinguish the disruption in
54
Tinker from the disruption caused by Fraser's speech.

The court of appeals also rejected the school district's argument that
Fraser's indecent language justified the disciplinary action. The school

relied on FCC v. PacificaFoundation5 5 to argue that school officials had
a legitimate interest in protecting teachers and students from offensive

and indecent speech, and that this interest outweighed Fraser's interest in
using sexual innuendo.5 6 In PacificaFoundation the Supreme Court held
that the imposition of administrative sanctions by the Federal Communi-

cations Commission (FCC) on a radio station for broadcasting George
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue5 7 did not violate the first amend-

ment, even though the broadcast was only indecent, and not obscene.5 8
The court of appeals distinguished Pacifica Foundation and concluded

that it did not apply to the high school assembly. 59
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the school district's third argument-that school officials could control the language used to convey

ideas at school-sponsored events. The school district relied on cases allowing school officials to control students' language at school-sponsored
52. Id. at 1366 (Wright, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1359-61.
55. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
56. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1361.
57. For a complete text of the monologue, see Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 751-55.
58. Id. at 748-51.
59. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1361-63. The Fraser court described the Court's decision in Pacifica
Foundation as resting on two principal rationales. First, "broadcasting intrudes directly on the privacy of an unwilling listener while he or she is at home"; and second, "broadcasting is uniquely
available to unsupervised children, even those too young to read." Id. at 1362. The court of appeals
concluded that Pacifica'sfirst reason-that broadcasting can be very intrusive upon the privacy of
the home-simply did not apply to a high school assembly. The court of appeals asserted that
students at a high school assembly could not expect the same measure of privacy and protection
from unwelcome language and ideas that they enjoyed at home. Id. The court also concluded that
Pacifica'ssecond reason-that broadcasting was accessible to impressionable young children-was
also inapplicable to a high school assembly. The Court stated: "[r]ealistically, high school students
are beyond the point of being sheltered from the potpourri of sights and sounds we encounter at
every turn in our daily lives. Although we may be offended by what we see and hear, that is a price
we pay for the privilege of living in a free and open pluralistic society." Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1363.
The court of appeals incorrectly analyzed these two rationales. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
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functions. 60 The court of appeals distinguished these cases and held that
"as long as the speech was neither obscene nor disruptive, the First
'6 1
Amendment protects [Fraser] from punishment by school officials."
II.

REGULATION OF SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In Fraser,the Supreme Court is again faced with a first amendment
case that focuses on the scope of governmental power to regulate
speech. 62 The Court has developed three analytic frameworks applicable
60. The court of appeals cited Nicholson v. Board of Edue., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982);
Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363-65. For a discussion of these cases, see
infra note 61.
61. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363-65. The school district argued that it had greater discretion to
control the content of the school curriculum and relied on Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982), to support this proposition. The court of appeals found this reliance "puzzling," Fraser,755
F.2d at 1364, because the court thought that Pico stood for the proposition that school administrators could control the content of the discussion in the classroom but could not extend their discretion beyond the classroom into the library. Id. The Fraser court concluded that the student
assembly was even further removed from the classroom environment than was a library; therefore,
Pico did not apply and did not support the proposition that the school administrators could control
sexually offensive and vulgar speech. Id.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of Pico misses two important points. First, in Pico the Court recognized that school administrators could remove books from the library that were vulgar so long as the
school administrators were not seeking to suppress a particular viewpoint. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871.
Second, the Ninth Circuit ignored the difference between a high school student who goes to a library
and chooses to read a book containing profanity or other vulgar speech, and school children who
attend a high school assembly without any warning that they will be forced to listen to sexually
vulgar and indecent speech. The child in the captive audience at the school assembly is in a very
different position from that of the child in the library. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying
text.
The school district also cited Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1981), where the
Third Circuit held that a school administrator's decision to cancel a drama class production of
"Pippin" because of its sexual content did not violate the first amendment. The Frasercourt distinguished Seyfried because it believed that the play was part of the curriculum while the school assembly was not. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1364-65. The court also distinguished Nicholson v. Board of Educ.,
682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982), where the court held that prepublication review of a student
newspaper published as part of a journalism class did not violate the first amendment because the
journalism class was part of the curriculum. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363-64. The Frasercourt misunderstood and misapplied the definition of curriculum. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying
text.
The court of appeals also distinguished Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977),
where the Second Circuit held that school officials could restrain student efforts to distribute a sex
questionnaire. The Frasercourt argued that the school officials in Trachtman had made an adequate
showing that distribution of the questionnaire would result in emotional harm to students, but that
the school administrators in Fraserhad failed to make a similar showing. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1365.
62. Public school authorities' actions are subject to the limitations placed on state action by the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 739-41 (1985) (school teachers and school principal); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (members of school board and
superintendent of schools); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)
(members of board of education).
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to government restrictions on speech: categorical proscription analysis;

traditional time, place, and manner analysis; and the public forum
doctrine.
A.

63

CategoricalProscription.
The Court has allowed content regulation in the form of categorical

proscription of certain types of speech. 64 The current categories of
speech that the government can proscribe include: (1) speech that cre-

ates a clear and present danger of illegal behavior, particularly of physical violence; 65 (2) defamation; 66 (3) false or misleading commercial
speech; 67 (4) child pornography; 68 and (5) obscenity. 69 Any contentbased statute or regulation that proscribes speech falling outside these
70
articulated categories will be declared unconstitutional.
B.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions.
The Court has used time, place, and manner analysis to assess the

constitutionality of incidental restrictions on speech. 71 Time, place, and

63. Professors Farber and Nowak have defined the three analytic frameworks and discussed
them extensively. See Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of PublicForum Analysis: Content
and Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1220-39 (1984).
64. Id. at 1226-30.
65. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (words "inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction") (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942)); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (words directed towards inciting "imminent lawless action,"
and likely to have such effect); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) ("offensive,
derisive, or annoying" words; subsequently narrowed by judicial construction to "fighting" words);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951) (hostile audience).
66. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
67. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66

(1980).
68. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
69. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23 (1973).
70. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 63, at 1229.
71. See, eg., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1980)
(Public Service Commission's order prohibiting Consolidated Edison from using utility bill inserts to
discuss political matters was not a valid time, place, and manner regulation because Commission
allowed inserts on certain subjects but prohibited inserts on matters of public controversy); Linmark

Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 90-91, 93 (1977) (township ordinance prohibiting
the posting of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in order to curtail "white flight" was not a
valid time, place, and manner regulation because it failed to leave open ample alternative channels of
communication and sought to suppress only signs with particular content); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (state statute
prohibiting prescription price advertising was not a valid time, place, and manner regulation because
it singled out speech of particular content and sought to prohibit it completely); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115, 118-21 (1972) (city's anti-noise ordinance prohibiting picketing that is
disruptive or incompatible with normal school activities was valid time, place, and manner regula-
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manner regulations aim at restricting the physical manner, location, or
time of the speech communication, not what is being said. 72 The Court
has recognized that the government can impose reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations on speech so long as the regulations (1) are content-neutral, 73 (2) serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave

open adequate alternative channels of communication. 74 In addition, the
Court will scrutinize an alleged time, place, and manner regulation to
ensure that it is not vague or overbroad. If the regulation fails to meet
any of the three criteria or is vague or overbroad, the Court will declare
the regulation an unconstitutional restriction of speech. 75
C. The Public Forum Doctrine.
The final analytic framework that the Court has developed is the

public forum doctrine. 76 The Court established the public forum doctrine as a method of determining when the government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest
of those wishing to use the property to exercise their right to freedom of
speech.7 7 The Constitution does not require the government to grant access to all those wishing to exercise their right to freedom of speech on
government property. The Court has defined three types of forums-the
quintessential public forum, the limited public forum, and the nonpublic
78
forum-as a means of analyzing content-related regulations.
tion since ordinance only punished picketing that disrupted school's normal activities); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (state statute prohibiting parades on public streets without
licenses is valid time, place, and manner regulation since statute's purpose is to prevent confusion
and disorder on public streets irrespective of content of parader's message).
72. See, eg., Farber & Nowak, supra note 63, at 1237.
73. But see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
74. See, eg., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3067 (1984), in
which the Court held that the National Park Service could refuse permission for a round-the-clock
demonstration in a Washington, D.C. park. The demonstrators wished to sleep in symbolic "tent
cities" in the park to call attention to the plight of the homeless. Id at 3068. The Court found that
the Park Service regulation prohibiting such demonstrations was a valid time, place, and manner
regulation because (1) it was a content-neutral means of promoting the government's substantial
interest in preserving park lands, and (2) it allowed adequate alternative channels of communication
because the government did not prohibit the demonstrators from using their signs protesting the
plight of the homeless to maintain an all-night vigil in the park. Id. at 3070; see also Heffron v.
International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (same criteria employed
in upholding a state regulation prohibiting sales and distributions of any merchandise except in
licensed location on fairgrounds).
.75. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977-79 (2d ed. 1983).
76. The article by Professors Farber and Nowak, supra note 63, at 1240-43, persuasively argues
that the Court should abandon the public forum doctrine in favor of a "focused balancing" test.
77. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985).
78. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-48 (1983).
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Quintessential public forums are places, such as public parks or

streets, that by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate. 79 In the quintessential public forum the govern-

ment must show that its content-based regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 80
Limited public forums are public properties that the government has

opened for use by the public as places for expressive activity. As in the
case of quintessential public forums, the Court applies the compelling
state interest standard when content-related regulations are imposed on
speech in a limited public forum; in contrast to the government's inability to foreclose use of the quintessential public forum, however, the gov-

ernment may close the limited forum altogether without violating the
first amendment. 81 Nonpublic forums are public properties that are not
by tradition designated as forums for public communication. In a nonpublic forum the government may prohibit speech on the basis of content
so long as the government has a rational basis and is acting in a viewpoint-neutral manner. 82

III.

TINKER AND THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

Many lower federal courts have assumed that Tinker's material and
substantial disruption standard is controlling on all questions of student
speech in the public secondary and elementary schools. 8 3 By not examining the validity of this assumption, however, the lower federal courts
have failed to recognize that Tinker represents only one of the three current modes of analysis that the Court uses in assessing restrictions on

speech-the public forum doctrine. In part, this failure stems from the
79. This notion is eloquently expressed in Justice Roberts's oft-quoted dictum in Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S 496, 515 (1939):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immuni-

ties, rights, and liberties of citizens.
80. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
81. See, eg., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 & n.5 (1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 175 & n.8 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 555-59 (1975) (municipal theater).
82. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3450-51,
3454 (1985) (charity drive aimed at federal employees); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (school mail facilities); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-31 (1981) (mailboxes of private homes); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977) (prison); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838
n.10 (1976) (military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality
opinion) (commercial advertising space on city buses).
83. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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fact that the decision preceded the formal articulation of the public forum doctrine. In any case, by limiting the inquiry in school free speech
cases to the Tinker analysis, it is obvious that many lower courts have, in
effect, conducted an incomplete analysis of the first amendment dimen-

sions of challenged regulations.
The public forum doctrine is used to determine when the government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose
outweighs the interest of the speaker who wishes to exercise his right to
freedom of speech. 84 The doctrine examines the nature of the public

property and evaluates the property's compatibility with expressive
activity.85
Under current public forum doctrine analysis, courts are first required to define the appropriate forum and then to determine whether it
is a quintessential public, limited public, or nonpublic forum. 86 When
the expressive activity is incompatible with the property's purpose-determined by the categorization of the property as quintessentially public,
84. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985).
85. See, eg., id. at 3449; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49
n.9 (1983); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6
(1981) (residential mailbox is nonpublic forum and delivering unstamped messages in residential
mailboxes is basically incompatible with maintenance of safe and efficient mail systems); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 842-43 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (military base is nonpublic forum, and
political rallies are basically incompatible with normal activity of military base).
86. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Edue. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985), the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and others (the "plaintiffs")
challenged their exclusion from the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a charity drive aimed at
federal employees. By executive order the CFC is limited to voluntary, tax-exempt, nonprofit charitable agencies that provide direct health and welfare services to individuals. Exec. Order No. 12404,
3 C.F.R. 151 (1984). The executive order specifically excludes legal defense and political advocacy
organizations. The plaintiffs challenged their exclusion on the grounds that the denial of the right to
seek CFC funds violated their first amendment right to solicit charitable contributions. Cornelius,
105 S. Ct. at 3443-47.
The Court stated that it had to define the relevant forum before determining whether the forum
was public or nonpublic. The government argued that the only government property involved was
the federal workplace; therefore, the Court's public forum doctrine should focus on the federal workplace. The plaintiffs argued that the forum should be defined in terms of the access sought by the
speaker. Under their view, the particular channel of communication constituted the forum; therefore, they argued that because they only sought access to the CFC, the CFC should be the relevant
forum for first amendment purposes. Id. at 3448-49.
The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the CFC was the proper forum. In defining the forum,
the Court announced that the proper focus was on the access sought by the speaker. When speakers
seek general access to public property, as in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 832 (1976), where Dr.
Spock sought access to the military base in order to hold a political rally, the forum encompasses
that property. In cases of limited access, however, such as the plaintiffs' access to the CFC, the
Court stated that a more tailored approach was appropriate in defining the forum. Cornelius, 105 S.
Ct. at 3449; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983)
(school mail facility, not entire school, was the proper forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
267-68, 267 n.5 (1981) (university meeting facility, not entire university, was the proper forum).
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limited public or nonpublic-the government may restrict speech without violating the first amendment. 87
In Tinker, the Supreme Court did not expressly rely on public forum doctrine analysis. The doctrine, in fact, was in a nascent stage and
had not been articulated as a distinct mode of analysis.88 Nonetheless,
the basic elements of what would come to be called "public forum doctrine" analysis were present in the Tinker decision. The Tinker Court
began by defining an entire secondary school campus as an appropriate

forum and concluded that a campus constituted a limited public forum. 8 9
The Court expressly refused to conclude that a public secondary school
should be treated as a prison,90 which, under current doctrine, is a nonpublic forum. 9 1 Instead, the Court balanced the students' first amendment rights against the schools' need for order and discipline, 92 in the
same manner in which the current public forum doctrine weighs the government's intended purpose against the interest of the speaker in exercising his right to freedom of speech. 93 The material and substantial
disruption standard is, thus, but one manifestation of a state interest suf-

ficiently compelling under current limited public forum analysis to justify
a restriction on speech and simply represents a conclusion that speech
that materially and substantially disrupts the educational process is incompatible with the secondary and elementary school environment. 94
Recognition that Tinker is simply a public forum decision compels

the conclusion that the material and substantial disruption standard is
not dispositive on all questions of student speech; rather, it constitutes
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
88. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 63, at 1221 (public forum doctrine received attention
twenty years ago, "but it was almost never used in Supreme Court opinions until recently").
89. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 ("no threats or acts of violence on the school premises"); id at
512-13 (Tinker does not merely apply to the classroom, but to the campus during school's authorized hours).
90. See id. at 512 n.6; cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 742 (1985) (refusing to equate
schools and prisons for fourth amendment purposes).
91. See, eg., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
92. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 ("Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of
First Amendment rights collide with rules of school authorities."); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
94. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3456, 3461
n.3 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1983) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Tinker for the proposition that speech must not
be incompatible with the primary activity of the school); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citing
Tinker for the proposition that "public properties are the appropriate fora for First Amendment
rights"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) ("Tinker made clear that school
property may not be declared off limits for expressive activity by students.").
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only one level of inquiry, and, as a result, lower courts are further required to determine whether the school can present some other compelling interest, 95 or whether a student's speech falls into a category that can
be prohibited, or whether a school regulation of speech can be sustained
as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.
IV.

FRASER RECONSIDERED

The Ninth Circuit in Fraser v. Bethel School District adopted the
widespread but erroneous assumption that Tinker was dispositive in student speech cases. 96 Had the court of appeals examined Matthew Fraser's speech under all three methods of analyzing speech restrictions, it
would not have deemed his punishment unconstituti6nal.
A.

CategoricalProscription.

Categorical proscription analysis would not have changed the result
in Fraser. The only category that the court might have considered was
obscenity. The school authorities conceded, however, that Fraser's
speech was not obscene. 9 7 Unless the Supreme Court extends categorical
proscription to include indecent speech, which it previously failed to do
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,98 Fraser's speech would remain protected
under this mode of analysis.
B. Public Forum Doctrine.
The court of appeals never expressly mentioned the public forum
doctrine in its analysis of Fraser's speech. The court did, however, reject
the argument that Fraser's speech at the school assembly was part of the
curriculum, thereby allowing the school administrators greater discretion
in regulating the speech. 99 Moreover, the court declared that the school
created an "open forum" 10° by allowing Fraser to speak. By rejecting the
argument that the school assembly was part of the curriculum and declaring that the school created an "open forum," the court seems to have
95. For example, some courts have held that the interest in protecting free speech within the
context of student activity periods for student-initiated religious groups is outweighed by establishment clause concerns. The establishment clause concerns might present compelling state interest
and justify prohibiting the groups. See, eg., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d
538, 559 (3d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S.Ct. 1167 (1985).
96. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
97. See Fraser,755 F.2d at 1361 n.5.
98. 438 U.S. 726, 740-41 (1978) (Court failed to create new categorical proscription of indecent

speech).
99. See Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363-65.
100. Id. at 1365.
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concluded that the school created a limited public forum'0 1 and that it
failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest, such as material and

substantial disruption, that would justify prohibiting the speech.
C.

Time, Place, and Manner Regulations.

The court of appeals apparently believed that the school administrators did create a limited public forum, yet it ignored the fact that the
Supreme Court has declared that, in any type of forum, the government
can impose reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.' 0 2 In
Tinker, the Court even recognized that school authorities could impose

reasonable regulations of speech. 0 3 To justify a restriction on speech as
101. It is not clear exactly what the Ninth Circuit meant by "open forum." Id. The court failed
to cite any authority. The Supreme Court, however, apparently used the term "open forum" in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981), to mean a limited public forum. In Widmar, the
Supreme Court determined that the public university created a limited public forum in its meeting
facilities; therefore, the university could not deny access to a student religion club that sought to use
these facilities. Id. at 267 n.5. The Court did not address the question whether Widmar applied in
the secondary school context but noted that university students "are less impressionable than
younger students." See id. at 274 n.14. Lower federal courts, however, have interpreted the term
"open forum" in the elementary and secondary school contexts to refer to a school's creation of a
limited public forum. See, eg., Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist. Bd. of
School Directors, 776 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1985) (school board did not create limited open forum
in school athletic facilities by intermittently allowing certain organizations such as the Special Olympics to use the facilities; therefore, board did not violate first amendment when it denied use of
facilities to Student Coalition for Peace, who wished to hold a peace fair); Bell v. Little Axe Indep.
School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1399-402 (10th Cir. 1985) (school district created limited open
forum in its elementary school by adopting equal access policy for all student groups who wished to
use school facilities); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 547-49 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985) (high school could create a limited open forum during its club
activity period just as university in Widmar created limited open forum); Kuhlmeier v. Hazeiwood
School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1463 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (school officials who create open forum for
student expression, such as school newspaper, are greatly limited in their ability to restrain or silence
student expression based on message's content); Clergy & Laity Concerned v. Chicago Bd. of Educ.,
586 F. Supp. 1408, 1411-13 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (high school created limited open forum by allowing
military recruiters to speak at high school; therefore, school must have compelling state interest to
deny access to peace activist group that wished to speak).
Congress has also used the term "open forum" in the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 407172 (West Supp. 1985). The Act was adopted to extend to secondary schools the constitutional principle adopted by the Supreme Court in the university context in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5. See S.
REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1984 U.S, CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2348,
2375; 130 Cong. Rec. S8355 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Levin); id. at S8357 (remarks
of Sen. Durenburger). Congress announced that "[a] public secondary school has [created] a limited
open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time." Equal
Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(b) (West Supp. 1985). Noninstructional time is defined as "time set
aside by the school before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction
ends." Id. § 4072(4).
102. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
103. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 ("We properly read [the Constitution] to permit reasonable
regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.").
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a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation, the government must
demonstrate that the regulation (1) is content-neutral, (2) serves a substantial and legitimate governmental interest, and (3) leaves open adequate alternative channels of communication.' 0 4 The school regulation
challenged in Fraseris a valid time, place, and manner regulation.
1. Content Neutrality: The Captive Juvenile Audience Exception.
The content-neutrality requirement appears at first to defeat any attempt
to justify the regulation of Fraser's speech as a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction. Members of the Supreme Court have, however,
recognized that time, place, and manner regulations need not be contentneutral when either a captive audience or a juvenile audience is present.10 5 In FCCv. PacificaFoundation, the Court upheld the FCC's declaratory order that a radio station that broadcast George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" monologue could be subject to administrative sanctions
because, in part, the afternoon broadcast was uniquely accessible to children. 10 6 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 0 7 the Court sustained a
municipal ordinance prohibiting political advertising on signs within
buses because the bus riders constituted a captive audience.10 8 Since the
high school assembly audience in Fraserwas both a captive and juvenile
audience, punishment of Fraser should fall within the content-neutrality
exception.109
2. The School's Substantialand Legitimate Interest. The significant governmental interest at stake in Fraseris, in essence, that of protecting school children from indecent speech. The interest, however,
consists of three interrelated factors: first, the school's interest in protecting students in a captive audience from vulgar and indecent
speech;' 0 second, the school's interest in controlling the use of indecent
104. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
105. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 85-86 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, J.J.) (recognizing that time, place, and manner regulations need not be content-neutral in the context of a captive or juvenile audience); see also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITuTION, 672-73 (1978); Farber, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727, 733 n.33 (1980).
106. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729-30, 749 (1978); see Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 643 (1968) (sustaining New York statute forbidding sale of pornographic magazines to
children).
107. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 302.
109. See also infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
110. See Board of Edue. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (plurality opinion) (state can legitimately remove books that are pervasively vulgar); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749-50; Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968); see also infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
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speech at a school function;"' third, the school's interest in inculcating
values, which permits it to prevent vulgar and indecent speech at a
112
school assembly.
a. Public school children at an assembly as a captive audience.
The first amendment presupposes a willing listener and a willing

speaker.11 3 A person in a captive audience, however, does not have the
opportunity to choose to listen or not to listen to offensive speech. If a

person is in a captive audience and subjected to offensive speech, the government may prohibit the offensive speech without abridging the
4
speaker's first amendment rights."

In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,115 Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the first amendment should preclude the Public Utilities

Commission from piping music into streetcars because the streetcar riders were a captive audience. Justice Douglas argued that "the man in the
streetcar has no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit and try not

to listen." 116 Justice Douglas rejected the contention that because streetcar riders choose to ride in the streetcar they are not a captive audience:

"[I]n a practical sense [streetcar riders] are forced to ride" because they
117

have no alternative.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,118 the Court accepted Justice
Douglas's view that streetcar riders are a captive audience. The Court

rejected the petitioner's claim that Shaker Heights abridged his first
amendment rights by prohibiting all political advertising on its buses." 9
Justice Douglas, concurring, emphasized the commuters' constitutional
rights: "While petitioner clearly has a right to express his view to those
who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience
111. See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
113. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981)
(first amendment "protects the right of every citizen to 'reach the minds of willing listeners' ");
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)
("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker."); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)
("[Free speech includes a right to communicate a person's views to any willing listener. .... ).
114. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 n.25 (1983); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 306-07 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Rosenfield v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), denying cert. to 59 N.J. 435, 283 A.2d 535 (1971); NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
116. Id. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 468.
118. 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974).
119. Id at 302-03. The Court has since classified Lehman as a case where the card space on the
public transportation system is a nonpublic forum. See, eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
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incapable of declining to receive it."12°
Students at the high school assembly, like streetcar riders, are a captive audience.12 1 Laws require the students to attend school daily. The
school administrators plan many events as part of the curriculum, in-

cluding events in the school auditorium. Once inside the school audito-

122
rium, the students cannot walk away from indecent and vulgar speech.
The students at the assembly have no choice "but to sit and listen, or
23
perhaps to sit and try not to listen."'

b. Minors exposed to indecent speech at an event that is part of the
curriculum. The second aspect of the school's substantial and legiti-

mate interest is its interest in regulating indecent and vulgar speech at an
organized school assembly. The Supreme Court has recognized that
states have a legitimate interest in protecting juveniles from indecent

speech

24 and

that school authorities can control offensive speech that is

25
presented as part of the curriculum.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation demonstrates that the Supreme Court
will uphold restrictions on a broadcast's indecent content in order to pro-

120. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
121. See, eg., Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1046 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971,
978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043,
1049 (2d Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 851 (2d Cir. 1977); Meltzer v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 574
(5th Cir.), cert denied,439 U.S. 1089 (1977); Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972); Egner v. Texas City Indep. School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931, 944
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
Cir. 1971); see also Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 960, 969 n.18 (1953); Diamond, supra note 26, at 493. But see Gambino v. Fairfax
County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
122. Fraser argued that students at Bethel High School were free to walk out of the assembly at
any time. See Brief of Respondent's In Opposition to Certiorari at 5-6, Fraser v. Bethel School Dist.,
106 S.Ct. 56 (1985). But because of the length of the speech, it would have been physically impossible for students to leave upon hearing the offensive speech. See supra note 48 (text of speech).
123. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
124. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. See Board of Edue. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (school authorities must be allowed to
establish and apply their curriculum in a way that transmits local community values; so long as
school authorities are not seeking to suppress the ideas presented in textbooks, they may remove
books from the school library that are pervasively vulgar).
The lower federal courts have also examined whether or not a student activity was part of the
curriculum in order to determine whether the school authorities could prohibit offensive and vulgar
speech. See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981) ("crucial factor in this case is the
relationship of the play to the school curriculum"); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564
F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (student newspaper not part of the school curriculum);
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1465 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (school newspaper
part of school curriculum).
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tect childreri. 126 The Supreme Court presented the following four rea-

sons for allowing the FCC to prohibit the afternoon broadcast of George
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue: (1) that the patently offensive and

indecent speech confronted the citizen in his own home; (2) that children
could easily gain access to the indecent speech; (3) that the indecent
speech abridged the primary caretaker's responsibility for the care of the

children; (4) that the state's independent interest in the well-being of its
youth justified restricting a minor's access to indecent speech. 127 The
four rationales presented in Pacifica Foundation also apply to the high

school assembly and support the argument that the school has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting children from indecent speech
at a school assembly.
Pacifica Foundation'sfirst rationale was that the patently offensive

and indecent speech confronted the citizen in his home. Obviously the
offensive language presented at a school assembly does not confront the
children in their homes, yet the children at the high school assembly
constitute a captive audience. 12 8 The privacy interests that allow a citizen to prevent offensive material from coming into his home 12 9 should
also apply to school children in a captive audience at a school
130
assembly.
126. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50.
127. In PacificaFoundation the Court rested its decision on several premises: (1) the fact that
indecent speech confronted the citizen in the privacy of his home, id. at 748; (2) the fact that the
broadcasts were "uniquely accessible to children," id. at 749; and (3) the relevance of "the concerns
recognized in Ginsberg," id. at 750. The Court in Ginsbergv. New York recognized two concerns, see
390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968); therefore, Pacfica Foundation has been treated as having four rationales.
In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute prohibiting merchants from selling pornographic magazines to children under 17. The Court based its decision on two concerns. First, the
Court justified the statute as promoting the parents' claim of authority to direct the rearing of their
children and to look out for the child's well-being. Id. at 639. Second, the Court recognized that the
State itself has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth. Id. at 640-41.
128. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
129. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). In Rowan the Supreme
Court sustained a federal statute that permitted recipients of unsolicited mail advertisements to have
the Postal Service order the advertiser to stop the mailings if the recipients believed the materials to
be erotically arousing or sexually provocative. Id. at 740. The Court rested its decision on the
citizen's privacy interest while in his home. The Court stated: "That we are often 'captives' outside
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we
must be captives everywhere." Id. at 738.
130. In Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, id. at 738, the Court cited Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1951), to support its argument that a citizen is often a "captive"
outside the sanctuary of his home in the sense that he will be unable to avoid being subjected to
objectionable speech. In Pollak the Court rejected Justice Douglas's argument that the first amendment protects the privacy rights of a person in a captive audience. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 464. Thus, it
would appear that a person in a captive audience outside his home would not have a sufficient
privacy interest to justify a restriction on offensive speech. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (plurality opinion), however, the Court accepted Justice Douglas's view
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The second rationale advanced by the Pacifica Court for prohibiting
Carlin's monologue was the "ease with which children can obtain access
to broadcast material." 131 Children could simply turn on the radio during the afternoon and be subjected to indecent and offensive language.
Pacifica'ssecond rationale applies to the high school assembly. A student is either forced to attend the assembly or chooses to attend, but in
either case the child has easy access to the assembly.1 32 Once the child
hears the offensive speech at the assembly, the damage has been done.
To say that the child could avoid further offense by "tuning out" the

speaker "is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after
133

the first blow."'
Pacifica Foundation'sthird rationale for prohibiting Carlin's monologue was that the indecent speech conflicted with the parents' authority
to direct and rear the child. The Court's concern, however, was not limited to the parents' authority because the Court, in Ginsbergv. New York,
upon which the Pacifica Foundation Court relied, had stated that "par-

ents and others, teachers,for example, who have [the] primary responsi-

134
bility for children's well-being are entitled to the [law's] support."'
Thus, the Court has recognized that parents and teachers have a responsibility to protect children from offensive and indecent speech.
Finally, Pacifica Foundation'sfourth rationale was that the state's

independent interest in the well-being of its youth justified limiting minors' access to indecent speech.13 5 The Court recognized that the state
has an interest in protecting children's welfare to ensure that they are
that the person on a streetcar was a captive audience and did have a sufficient privacy interest to
justify a governmental restriction on speech.
131. PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at 750.
132. The court of appeals in Fraser found it significant that the students were given a choice
between attending the assembly or attending a study hall. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1364. It is important
to remember, however, that "[the law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Thus, an "alternative" might be illusory.
133. PacificaFound, 438 U.S. at 748-49. The court of appeals in Fraserrejected this rationale in
the high school context because the court thought that the Supreme Court in PacificaFoundation
was only concerned with children too young to read. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 755 F.2d 1356,
1362-63 (9th Cir. 1985). The Frasercourt, however, ignored the fact that in PacificaFoundationthe
child involved was 15 years old. See WBAI ruling: Supreme Court saves the worst for last, BROADCASTING, July 10, 1978, at 20. Furthermore, in Pacifica Foundation the Court stated that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read," PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at
749, which means that the Court was concerned primarily but not exclusively with children too
young to read.
134. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (emphasis supplied); cf Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 594 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) ("[Tihe teacher must occupy
many roles-educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute.").
135. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (quoting People v. Kaham, 15 N.Y.2d
311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1965) (Fuld, J., concurring)).
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"safeguarded from abuses," 136 including the abuse of indecent speech.
The state's interest is even stronger in the school environment at an assembly that is part of the curriculum.
37
The school assembly in Fraserwas part of the school curriculum. 1

The Supreme Court has recognized that high school authorities must be
able to plan their school curriculum in such a way as to transmit local
and community values. 138 The school administrators allowed the stu-

dents to have the assembly in order to teach rhetoric and leadership in
the process of electing the student government. 139 The State of Washing-

ton expressly subjects each public high school student government to regulation: Student body governments are "formal organization[s] of the

students of a school formed with the approval of and regulation by the
board of directors of the school district." 140 The school administrators

did not give the student an "absolute constitutional right to use [the]...
school [assembly] . ..for his unlimited expressive purposes." 14' It is
implausible to argue that a student should be able to say anything at a

school assembly so long as it is not obscene or does not materially and
substantially disrupt the school environment.' 42
136. Id (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
137. Although the assembly is not part of the classroom curriculum, lower federal courts have
recognized that non-classroom activities can also be part of the school curriculum. See Seyfried v.
Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981) (school play); ABC League v. Missouri State High School
Activities Ass'n, 530 F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (interscholastic athletics), rev'd, 682 F.2d
147 (1982); Matute v. Carson Long Inst., 160 F. Supp. 827, 828 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (varsity football
program); cf.WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557 (1981) (defining "curriculum" as "all planned school activities including besides courses of study organized play, athletics,
dramatics, clubs, and home-room program[s]").
138. See Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (school boards must be permitted "to
establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values").
139. See Fraser,755 F.2d at 1367 (Wright, J., dissenting).
140. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A-58.115 (Supp. 1986).
141. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
142. For example, racially or religiously inflammatory speech at a school assembly might not be
disruptive, but it is incompatible with the assembly. Several writers have suggested that racially or
religiously inflammatory speech in the school setting should be subject to strict controls due to the
age and captivity of the audience. See, eg., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO

SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION, at 84-91 (tent. draft 1977) (4.2C and commentary); Berkman, Students
in Court: Free Speech and the FunctionsofSchooling in America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567 (1970);
Garvey, Children and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321, 363-64 (1979); Gyory, The ConstitutionalRights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 216-19 (1971).
Moreover, despite language in Tinker to the contrary, 393 U.S. at 511 (students both in and out
of school are, under our Constitution, "persons" possessing fundamental rights), the constitutional
rights of minors are not coextensive with those of adults. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 214 & n.11 (1975) (striking down as overbroad ordinance aimed at prohibiting minors
from viewing any film containing nudity); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) (first
amendment rights of minors are not coextensive with those of adults); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
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c. The school's role in inculcating community values. The third
aspect of the school's legitimate and substantial interest is the fact that
allowing indecent and vulgar speech at a school assembly is not consistent with the school's role in inculcating community values. The
Supreme Court,1 4 3 lower federal courts, 1 " and commentators1 45 have
recognized that public high school authorities are responsible not only
for educating children but also for inculcating social values. The duty to
inculcate community values includes the duty to condemn and discourage the use of indecent speech. 14 6 The school's failure to condemn indecent speech at a school assembly violates this duty and may be
interpreted as approval. 147
U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, 3., concurring) (in certain areas, a child does not possess the full
capacity for individual choice that the first amendment presupposes).
A minor's constitutional right to privacy in abortion and birth control decisions is not coextensive with that of adults. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 634-37 (1979) (a state has greater authority to enact laws affecting minors deciding
whether to have abortions than to enact laws affecting adults in same situation because of minor's
lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 &
n.15 (1977) (state restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid if they serve any "significant state interest" that is not present in the case of adult, and "significant state interest" standard is
less rigorous than "compelling state interest" test applied to restrictions on privacy rights of adults).
Minors are, however, entitled to coextensive rights when they are defendants in criminal proceedings. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (prohibition of double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 33, 35, 47, 56-57 (1967) (rights to notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and
privilege against self-incrimination); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962) (protection
against the use of coerced confessions).
The constitutional rights of minors are particularly circumscribed in a public school setting. Cf
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 742-43 (1985) (probable cause not required in school searches
because students have a lesser expectation of privacy than in nonschool setting); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (cruel and unusual punishment clause of eighth amendment does
not apply to corporal punishment in public secondary schools).
143. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77
(1979).
144. See, eg., East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1977).
145. See, eg., Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
35, 51 (1969); Diamond, supra note 26, at 499-501; Garvey, supra note 142, at 373.
146. See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (great
deference should be accorded school authorities when they prohibit material because of overt sexual
references or vulgarity); Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman,
J., concurring in result) ("[Wlhether a school condemns or tolerates indecent language within its
sphere of authority will have significance for the future of that school and of its students."), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 1081 (1980); Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEO. L.J. 37, 56 (1970). Cf. supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing racially
inflammatory speech).
147. See, eg., Seyfried v. Walton, 688 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 802 (N.D. Iowa 1972).

1186

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1164

The Ninth Circuit did not believe that the school's role in inculcating community values permitted it to apply an indecency standard to the
high school student's speech. The court of appeals stated:
We fear that if school officials had the unbridled discretion to apply a
standard as subjective and elusive as "indecency" in controlling the
speech of high school students, it would increase the risk of cementing
white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and
proper speech and behavior in our public schools.148
The Ninth Circuit's fear is unfounded and ignores the role local school
boards, principals, teachers and parents play in educating the nation's
children.
t49
"School boards are uniquely local and democratic institutions."'
School board members are elected to educate the nation's youth during
the latter's most formative and impressionable years. 150 Elections to local school boards are often hotly contested and present the electorate
with wide-ranging ideological choices. 15 1 Once elected, the school board,
through parent-teacher organizations, is more informed and aware of the
community's values than any other governmental agency.' 5 2 Thus, there
is no reason to believe that the values imparted to school children will be
other than those held by the particular community in which the school is
located; and if the school board and the administrators it hires are "cementing white, middle-class standards,"' 53 or any standards for that
matter, through the use of unconstitutional restrictions on speech, the
board is answerable to the electorate and to the federal judiciary. The
members of the Supreme Court have recognized the importance of education,' 54 the school board's democratic nature, 55 and its accountability
resulting from close community supervision of the nation's public
schools.' 56 Courts should not disregard the school's role in inculcating
148. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363.
149. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see Diamond,
supra note 26, at 509.
150. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
151. See Diamond, supra note 26, at 509.
152. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363.
154. See, eg., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (recognizing

the "undisputed importance of education"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)
("[E]ducation prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.");

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("education is perhaps the most important
function" of government).
155. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
156. See, eg., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 748 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (community provides substantial protection against violation of constitutional rights by school authorities);

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (refusing to extend eighth amendment protection to
public secondary schools because of community supervision of schools).
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community values and the unique ability of the school board to conduct
this task merely because of an unsubstantiated fear that by disciplining
students for using sexually vulgar and indecent speech they will cement
white middle-class values.
3. Alternative Channels of Communication. When the Court has
upheld the use of time, place, and manner regulations to ban speech it
157
has emphasized the need for alternative channels of communication.
In Fraser,alternative channels of communication are present. The student who wishes to use indecent and vulgar speech can do so after school
or in a situation where the listeners voluntarily accept such speech. A
contrary argument, however, is suggested by Schneider v. State.158 There
the Court stated that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of

expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." 159 In Schneider, the Court rejected the argu-

ment that a city ordinance prohibiting distribution of leaflets on streets
and alleys could be justified on the grounds that the leaflets could be

distributed elsewhere.160 The weakness of this argument is that the
school assembly is not the "appropriate place" for indecent speech. In
fact, indecent speech is "basically incompatible" with the school

assembly.
The Supreme Court first focused on the question of "basic incompatibility" in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 16 1 where the Court was faced
157. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Compare Heffron v. International Soe'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (finding sufficient alternative channels of communication left open by the statute to sustain it as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation)
with Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (town ordinance
prohibiting posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs failed to leave open ample alternative channels of
communication since only alternative channels were listing house with real estate agent or using
newspaper advertising, each of which cost significant amount of money) and Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17 (1981) (city ordinance imposing substantial prohibitions on
off-premises outdoor noncommercial advertising display signs fails to leave open ample alternative
channels of communication because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate, and
prohibitively expensive).
158. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
159. Id. at 163.
160. Id.
161. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Since Grayned v. City of Rockford, members of the Court have used
the "basic incompatibility" language seven times to assess both time, place, and manner regulations
and public forum cases. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 185 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (passing out leaflets on steps of Supreme Court is not "basically incompatible" with normal
sidewalk activity); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 63 n.7 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (granting outsiders access to school mailboxes is not "basically incompatible" with the school's normal activity); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6 (1981) (civic associations' practice of delivering messages to local
residents by placing unstamped notices in residential mailboxes is "basically incompatible" with the
maintenance of a safe and efficient national mail system); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
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with the question whether Rockford's anti-noise ordinance was overbroad. The ordinance prohibited people on public or private property
adjacent to a school building from making noise that would disturb the
school while it was in session. 162 The petitioners claimed that Rockford's

anti-noise ordinance interfered with their first and fourteenth amendment right to picket on a public sidewalk near a school. The Court ana-

lyzed Rockford's ordinance to determine whether it was a valid time,
place, and manner regulation. The Court stated: "The nature of a place,
'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of
time, place, and manner that are reasonable'. . . . The crucial question

is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."' 63 The Court
noted that the touchstone of its analysis was Tinker, and said: "[W]e
nowhere suggested [in Tinker] that students, teachers, or anyone else has
an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its

immediate environs for his unlimited expressive purposes."'

64

While the Court in Tinker did not expressly state that it was exam-

ining the school children's speech for basic incompatibility with the
school environment, an examination of the decision shows that it was. In
Tinker the Court balanced the students' right to freedom of expression

against the school administrators' need for discipline and control in the
school.1 65 The Court recognized that it had to apply the students' first

amendment rights "in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment" 166 and announced the material and substantial disruption
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(rejecting argument that the respondents' desire to distribute literature and solicit funds was "basically incompatible" with the normal activity of the fair); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 74-75 (1981) (initial question in determining validity of city ordinance prohibiting all live
commercial entertainment as a time, place, and manner regulation was whether live entertainment
was "basically incompatible" with the normal activity in commercial areas); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 482-83 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that a city ordinance that prohibited
residential picketing was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction because residential picketing was "basically incompatible" with the normal activity in one's home); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 842-43 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (political rallies are "basically incompatible" with the
normal activity of a military base).
162. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 105-08, 114.
163. Id. at 116 (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1042
(1969)).
164. Id. at 117-18.
165. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-07. "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students." Id. at 506. However, "the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the States and school officials." Id. at 507. "Our problem lies in the area where students in the
exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of school authorities." Id.; see also Denno,
supra note 145, at 57; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 75, at 991.
166. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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standard.1 67 Material and substantial disruption is "basically incompatible" with the school's purpose to educate children. 168 Lower federal
courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Fraser,have assumed that the only
incompatibility between student speech and the school's purpose arises
when the student's speech materially and substantially disrupts the
school's operation.1 69 Some speech, however, that does not materially
and substantially disrupt the school's operation can also be "basically
1 70
incompatible" with the school's environment.
Thus, the school authorities can demonstrate that Fraser had alternative channels of communication available in which to express his

thoughts indecently. The action of the school authorities, under current
time, place, and manner analysis, was therefore not invalidated by arguments that a school assembly is an appropriate place in which to give an
indecent speech.
167. Id. at 512-13.
168. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3461 n.3 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Tinker requires showing of incompatibility).

169. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
In assessing the "compatibility" of indecent speech with the educational environment, it is important to distinguish a public university assembly from a public secondary or elementary school
assembly. The public university's mission is education. The university can impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5, 270 (1980) (public university is limited public forum, at least for its
students; therefore, state must show that regulation concerning speech is necessary to serve compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end). However, there exists within
every university the means and facilities by which ideas may be presented and challenged through
interactive discussion. The ideas presented in the active debate at a university assembly may offend
some students. Nonetheless, the mere dissemination of offensive or indecent ideas at a university
assembly should not be cut off in the name of "decency." See Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S.
667, 670-71 (1973) (per curiam) (indecent political cartoon and profane headline in public university's paper held not obscene or unprotected). Generally speaking, indecent speech at a university
assembly is not at all incompatible with the public university's mission or with the age and experience of its student body. It is highly unlikely that a university would ever have an assembly comparable to a high school assembly. Students in a university have a great deal more freedom in choosing
whether or not to attend any public gathering or debate. Although the university could impose
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on any event taking place on campus, see supranotes
71-75 and accompanying text, the university could not use the captive juvenile audience exception in
justifying those regulations. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
The educational mission of the public elementary and secondary schools is more circumscribed
than that of the public university. See, eg., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 914 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (distinguishing secondary schools from universities); Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 547-48, 554 (3d Cir. 1984) (educational mission of high school is
more circumscribed than that of university), cert. granted,105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985). The high school is
more structured and the students are less mature than those in a university. While the public university's mission and its assemblies are designed in part to provide a battleground for clashes between
contending lines of thought, the high school assembly has a much more limited scope and, therefore,
has a lower threshold for speech that is basically incompatible with the environment.
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4. Vagueness or Overbreadth. In order for the Court to sustain
the school regulation as a valid time, place, and manner regulation, the
school regulation must not be vague or overbroad. 1 7 1 In conducting this
assessment, it is important to remember that school disciplinary rules
must be capable of addressing a myriad of circumstances that require
prompt and effective disciplinary action.' 72 Furthermore, school regulations are typically developed by local school boards with the participation of concerned parents, school officials, and members of the
community, and reflect the community's expectations for socially acceptable conduct.1 73 Thus, school disciplinary regulations must be interpreted flexibly' 74 and must not be held to the criminal law's standards for
vagueness and overbreadth.1 75 If the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the
Bethel High School disciplinary regulation flexibly, 176 the regulation
would have withstood both vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
a. Vagueness. The Supreme Court has recognized that to withstand a vagueness challenge statutes written specifically for the school
context need only to delineate their reach "in words of common understanding" and to be viewpoint-neutral.' 77 Bethel High School's regulation did not specifically prohibit the use of indecent speech at a school
assembly; 78 however, the regulation did prohibit "acts which disrupt
and interfere with the educational process. . . including the use of ob171. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
172. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985).
173. Cf supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text (discussing role of school board and parents
in formulating school policy in manner that inculcates community values).
174. See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (then-Circuit Judge Blackmun declaring that "flexibility and elbow
room" must be given to school regulations); Whitfleld v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 898 (E.D. Ill.
1970) (greater flexibility should be used in assessing regulations governing high school students than
those governing college students because of differences in the range of activities subject to discipline
and in the age of students); cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985) ("[Mlaintaining...
order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures. .... ").
175. See, eg., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir.
1973); Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973); Sword v.
Fox, 446 F.2d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Esteban v. Central Missouri
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
176. See Fraser,755 F.2d at 1365 n.12. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling
that the school's misconduct rule was unconstitutional because on its face it allowed school authorities to discipline students for using indecent speech in extracurricular activities. Although the district court's language is far from clear, see Petitioner's Brief at B-23, Fraser v. Bethel School Dist.,
755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985), the district court apparently applied
criminal vagueness and overbreadth requirements to the school regulation.
177. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972); see also supra notes 161-64 and
accompanying text (discussing Grayned).
178. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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scene, profane language or gestures." 179 Thus, the definition includes
both acts and speech that disrupt and interfere with the education process. The overriding idea behind the school regulation, as demonstrated
by its text, is the prohibition of speech or conduct that is basically incompatible with the school environment. 180 School administrators should
not be expected to draft rules that specifically delineate each type of prohibited conduct or speech.18 1
In assessing the school regulation, it is also important to note that
the school authorities did not seek to punish a student for the expression
of an unpopular point of view. 18 2 Matthew Fraser testified that he knowingly used "sexual innuendo" in his nominating speech. Fraser delivered
the speech to establish rapport with the students. 183 He wished to
demonstrate that, like his candidate, he had the political guts to stand up
before the administration and deliver a speech that some students would
find witty but that the administration would find inappropriate. By demonstrating that he and his candidate would stand up and deliver an offensive speech, Fraser wished to demonstrate that they were184willing to take
risks and face the adversary, the school administration.
The school administrators, however, did not wish to suppress the
185
idea that a student government officer would stand up and challenge
the school administration. The school administration merely wished to
regulate the form of the message in light of the school assembly environment. Justice Stevens has emphasized that "[g]overnmental suppression
of a specific point of view strikes at the core of First Amendment values.
In contrast, regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally
appropriate balance between the advocate's right to convey a message
and the recipient's . . . environment."1 86 A requirement that indecent
language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than
the content of serious communication. There are few, if any, ideas which
179. Id
180. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text (discussing the "basic incompatibility" rule
used to assess time, place, and manner regulations); see also supra notes 174-76 and accompanying
text (flexible interpretations of school regulations).
181. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
182. See, eg., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972) ("Rockford's anti-noise
ordinance does not permit punishment for the expression of an unpopular point of view .... .
183. Fraser,755 F.2d at 1363.
184. See Respondent's Brief in Support of Denial of Certiorari at 16, Fraser v. Bethel School
Dist., 106 S.Ct. 56 (1985) (granting certiorari).
185. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (Constitution does not permit official
suppression of ideas, yet school administrators can remove books that are not educationally
suitable).
186. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (foot-

note omitted).
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cannot be presented in an environmentally appropriate form.18 7
b. Overbreadth. A clear and precise enactment may be "overbroad" if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected speech.18 8
The Court disdains overbroad laws because such laws chill privileged
speech.18 9 "The crucial question. . . is whether the [law] sweeps within
its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 190 The school regulation does not.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,19 1 persons arrested and convicted
for violating Rockford's anti-picketing ordinance argued that the ordinance was overbroad. 192 The Court rejected the overbreadth argument
and sustained the regulation as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. 193 The Court noted that the touchstone of its analysis was
Tinker 194 and that the crucial question in assessing regulations of speech
or conduct in the school context is whether the manner of expression
prohibited is "basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." 195 So long as the regulation does not
sweep in speech or conduct that is compatible with the school environment, and therefore protected, such as the black armbands in Tinker, the
ordinance should be sustained against an overbreadth challenge. 196
Thus, interpreting the school regulation flexibly in light of the
school environment, it is evident that the regulation merely seeks to
reach speech that is "incompatible with normal school activities,"' 97 a
category which includes indecent speech communicated to a captive juvenile audience.
187. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (plurality) (opinion of Stevens, J.).

188. See, eg., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967) and cases cited therein.

189. See, eg., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
190. Id. at 114-15.
191. Id. at 104.
192. Id. at 114. The city's anti-picketing ordinance provided:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: (i) Pickets or demonstrates on a
public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the school is
in session and one-half hour before the school is in session and one-half hour after the
school session has been concluded. ...

Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 115.
194. Id. at 117.

195. Id. at 116.
196. See id. at 117-18.
197. Id. at 120.
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CONCLUSION

For sixteen years the lower federal courts have assumed that
Tinker's material and substantial disruption standard is dispositive on
questions of secondary and elementary school student speech. The lower
federal courts have failed to realize that Tinker actually is a public forum
doctrine case in which the Court defined the public secondary and elementary schools as limited public forums. Accordingly, courts should
employ traditional time, place, and manner analysis in assessing the validity of school regulations concerning student speech. Because the
Ninth Circuit improperly read Tinker and thereby erroneously invalidated a school regulation that was a legitimate time, place, and manner
restriction, Fraserv. Bethel School Distict offers the Supreme Court an
opportunity to correct this sixteen-year-old misperception.
James C. Dever III

